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EPOR T 


'C 


OF THE 


EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 


A 


OF 






THE ELMIRA 


Cinil mm IRrform ls0orifltio.11 

FOR 1882. 

WITH ESSAYS OX 

“LEGISLATION AND THE SPOILS SYSTEM,” 

BY FREDERICK COLLIN. 

“THE REAL OBJECTS OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM” 

BY CHARLES R. PRATT. 


ELMIRA, N. Y.: 

ADVFRT1SRR \SSOCIATION, BOOK AND JOB PRINTERS. 

1883. 










OK.FICIilt.S. 


President, 

FRANCIS HALL. 



/ 'ice- Presidents, 

SEYMOUR DEXTER, M. H. ARNOT, 

S. HOTCHKIN, W. C. WHY, 

C. J. LANCDON. 


treasurer. 


JOHN C. C JR EVES. 







Secretary, 

THERON A. WALES. 


EXECUTIV E COMMITTEE, 

C. R. PRATT, E. L. ADAMS, 

J. L. WOODS, EDGAR DENTON, 

FREDERICK COLLIN, C. G. DECKER, 

P. B. CALL, J. R. JOSLYN, 

J. H. BARNEY. 


Nil // 


National Vice-President, 

J. D. F. SEEK. 


Delegate to National Isa^ue, 

C. A. COLLIN, 




L 


REPORT OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. 


I 


s 

) 



a 

•) 


Gentlemen —The Elmira Civil Service Reform Association was 
organized on the evening of October 24, 1882, by the adoption of 
a constitution and by-laws, and a provisional list of officers to 
hold until the annual election, which it was provided should 
take place on the first Thursday in March, 1883. A resolution 
was also passed at this meeting directing that regular monthly 
sessions of the society should be held, at which discussions 
should take place or addresses be delivered on topics apper¬ 
taining to civil service reform. The following is the list of 
officers chosen at the meeting: 

President—General A. S. Diven. 

Vice-Presidents—John Arnot, C. J. Langdon, Samuel Hotchkin, 
Thomas K. Beecher and Francis Hall. 

Secretary—Dr. T. A. Wales. 

Treasurer—John C. Greves. 

Executive Committee—J. D. F. Slee, J. R. Joslyn, C. P. Bacon, 
C. G. Decker, C. R. Pratt, J. H. Barney, Boyd McDowell, E. L. 
Adams and C. A. Collin. 


The Association thus organized proceeded promptly to work. 
A short circular was prepared by the Publication Committee, to 
which was appended a copy of the constitution and a list of 
members. This was circulated as perfectly as possible, and at 
each subsequent meeting of the Executive Committee large num¬ 
bers of new names were added. 





2 


Before the November election, also, a letter was issued addressed 
to each of the congressional candidates of the district, asking 
their views on civil service reform, and from each a reply was 
received of a courteous and satisfactory nature. These letters 
were published at the time in the daily papers, and it has not 
been thought worth while on that account to reproduce them 
here. 

The monthly meeting for November was addressed by Francis 
Hall at some length and in a very acceptable manner, and his 
remarks were followed by other good speeches from members 
of the Association. 

The December meeting was taken up with an examination and 
discussion of the Pendleton bill, so-called, which was then 
before Congress, and at the close of the debate a resolution was 
passed directing the Executive Committee to address a letter to 
the lion. I). P. Richardson, our member in Congress, soliciting 
his favorable consideration of, and vote for, the bill at the 
proper time. When the bill passed Mr. Richardson’s vote was 
recorded in favor of the same, and a brief note to the Secretary 
from him called attention to the fact. 

In January the chairman of the Publication Committee pro¬ 
cured the services of Professor W. G. Sumner, of Yale College, 
who delivered a trenchant and spirited lecture in the Elmira 
Opera House to a tine audience, composed of some of the most 
intelligent citizens of this place. His words did a great deal to 
awaken wider and more intelligent interest in the objects sought 
after by the Association. 

About the time of the passage of the reform bill by Congress 
the Executive Committee procured and circulated a large number 
of “ Publication number four,” of the New York Association, 
entitled “Civil Service Reform in the New York Custom House,” 
by Willard Brown. This is a clear statement of real results 
following the application of the reforms in the custom house, 
and has been well received. 

Hon. J a. Hawley 



3 

The committee lias also disseminated much minor information 
relating to the subject, and has furnished many items for the pub¬ 
lic press. 

At the February meeting carefully prepared papers were read by 
Frederick Collin and Charles 11. Pratt, copies of which are annexed 
to this report. The Rev. F. I). Hoskins had expected to present 
one, but the care and confusion incidental to the breaking up 
of his household, preparatory to removal from the city, pre¬ 
vented. He, however, gave the Association a stirring extempora¬ 
neous talk, which was received with much applause. 

The Executive Committee has held regular meetings on the 
afternoon preceding the monthly evening meetings of the Associa¬ 
tion, and transacted such business as came before it. 

The Chairman has been ably seconded by his associates, and is 
under special obligation to the chairmen of the Sub-Committees 
on Publication and Finance, Messrs. Joslyn and Pratt, for their 
effective assistance. 

The report of the Treasurer and Finance Committee is sub¬ 
joined. In conclusion the Executive Committee desire to particu¬ 
larly recognize the courtesy of the daily papers of the city in the 
free use of their columns, and other kindnesses extended at vari¬ 
ous times to the Association, and to thus make public recognition 
of the same. 

And, finally, we congratulate the Association, and all honest 
seekers after political improvement in our governmental methods, 
on the unexpected but highly satisfactory progress made during 
the past year toward civil service reform. Much remains to be 
done. But let us be thankful that something has been accom¬ 
plished. There is need, however, that our organization be kept 
intact, and a watchful eye maintained upon the experiment about 
to be tried. There are men who would willingly ruin it. 


4 

REPORT OF FINANCE COMMITTEE. 


Receipt*. 

Received from dues of members. $105 00 - 

Received from contributions to lecture fund. 50 00 

Total receipts. $164 00 

Expenditures. 

Paid expenses of Sumner’s lecture. $89 83 

Paid for stationery, printing, postage and documents 

for circulation. 69 M 

Paid for use of R. Y. M. C. A. hall. 3 00 

Total expenditures. $162 77 

Balance on hand. 1 23 

(Signed) 

TIIERON A. WALES, 

J. D. F. SLEE, Secretary. 

Chairman. 












LEGISLATION AND THE SfOILS SYSTEM, 


ESSAY READ BY FREDERICK COLLIN, Esq., BEFORE THE ELMIRA 
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ASSOCIATION, MONDAY EVENING, 

FEBRUARY 12, 1883. 


Gentlemen of tiie Association — I have thought it would be 
instructive, and perhaps interesting, to consider to what extent 
legislation has tended to foster or hinder the growth of that sys¬ 
tem briefly, but sufficiently, designated as the Spoils System. 

The civil service, that is, the appointment, compensation and 
service of civil officers and employes of the Government, is dis¬ 
tributed among the three great departments, the Judicial, Legis¬ 
lative and Executive; the Executive department consisting of the 
President and his Cabinet, the heads of its various departments, 
and all persons, other than those of the Judicial or Legislative 
departments, connected with or employed by the Government. 
What I shall say relates to only that branch of the civil service con¬ 
nected with the Executive department. 

In the year 1787, this people of the United States, having, with 
a courage and heroism unsurpassed in epic or legend, vindicated 
its right to be a free and independent people, framed a written 
constitution, prescribing a form of government, patterned after 
philosophers’ theories and poets’ dreams; a government by the 
people, in conception and form a very near neighbor to anarchy. 
It was a form of government adapted only to a nation whose 
citizens were loyal, intelligent and incorruptible; jealous of, 
and exercising with pride, the privileges of their citizenship. 




6 


To them were left the responsibilities of keeping the national 
character and the development of the administrative machinery 
in harmony with the Constitution. 

The civil service of to-day is a growth resulting from admin¬ 
istrative requirements, which were, to those who framed the Con¬ 
stitution, unknown and inconceivable. Such provisions us they 
made in regard to it are, “And he (the President) shall nominate, 
anti by, and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall 

hppoint ambassadors . and all other ofi'cers of the United 

States whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for. 

. Hut the Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of 

mtch inferior ojficers as they think proper, in the President alone, 
in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.” 

Some lawyers and legislators have held that the terms “all 
other officers,” and “such inferior officers,” do not include clerks 
and employes of the government, but legislation and judicial 
authority have established the contrary. 

' The provisions fix no term of office, and no manner nor ground 
of removal. It was, however, from the first held that the power 
of removal was in the President, as an incident to the power of 
appointment. 

To state it concisely, under the Constitution the President 
had the power to appoint, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, each of the body of persons constituting the civil service. 

The President had the absolute power to remove any of such 

l 

appointees. 

Congress might limit the President's power to appoint, by vest¬ 
ing the appointment of such inferior officers as it thought proper, 
in the heads of departments. 

In these slender provisions there was room for much mischief 
and peril, unseen by, but perhaps not wholly without the imagi¬ 
nation of some of our early statesmen. Until the year 1820, 
these provisions were supplemented by certain rules, or principles, 
which had the full force and effect of positive law. They were: 

First—Every office is a public trust, existing solely for the pur¬ 
pose of carrying on and managing the business of the Govern- 



7 

ment in the most economical and efficient manner, and appoint¬ 
ments must be made with that purpose alone in view. 

Second—Congress had authority, and it was its duty “to im¬ 
peach the President, if he should either allow an unworthy officer 
to retain his place or wantonly remove a meritorious officer,” 
such removal being an act of “maladministration.” 

Third—The tenure of office was that of efficiency and good 
behavior. 

Surely no citizen, no business man employing a clerk, will dis¬ 
pute the soundness, nor the practical character of those principles, 
yet to have brought them to the attention of a modern Congress 
would have seemed the very refinement of irony. 

Near the close of the session of the Congress of 1820, a bill, pre¬ 
pared by cunning and unscrupulous, even if not unprincipled, 
politicians, was introduced and, without debate and the yeas and 
nays being called, was passed and became law. It fixed the terms 
of office of district attorneys, collectors of customs, surveyors of 
customs, naval and certain other officers, at four years, and made 
those officers removable at the pleasure of the President. This law 
did not create the Spoils System. It did, however, in response to 
the requests of its sponsors and attendants, open the door and 
permit and encourage that system to enter and make its home in 
the Federal Government. A moment’s thought will demonstrate 
how thoroughly hostile it was to the principles then in force, 
as I have stated. The tenure of efficiency and good behavior 
was changed to that of “at the pleasure of the President.” 
It would no longer be an act of “ mal-administration ” to 
remove a worthy officer, or allow an unworthy officer to retain 
his position. If efficiency and character were no longer to be 
the tests for retention of office, they would not be for appoint¬ 
ment to office. Their substitutes were skill in manipulating and 
controlling caucuses and elections, zeal for the party and fealty 
to party leaders. The term of ollicc was made the presidential 
term so that the offices and subordinate offices connected with 
them, might be held out in each election as plunder or spoils, to 
incite to victory. 


8 


These subversive principles once introduced and recognized by 
law, quickly spread through the entire Government. At the 
passage of the law its intent and effects were unperceived by all, 
save ouly its devisers, but when afterwards made plain it met 
with vehement public condemnation from nearly every statesman 
who receives an honorable mention in history. Attempts were 
made to effect its repeal, but the law, in assisting unworthy men 
to office and positions of influence, was its own protector. The 
Senate passed the repealing act, the House refused and the law is 
still in force. 

The supply of “ Spoils ” was further increased, in 1836, by a 
law providing that the terms of all postmasters whose com¬ 
pensation was $1,000 a year, or upwards, should be four years, 
and they should likewise be removable at the pleasure of the 
President. 

For some years prior to 1853, the civil service of England, 
which had become inefficient and corrupt, received at the hands 
of her statesmen grave consideration, resulting in reformative 
legislation. Its spirit reached our legislative chambers and 
quickened the desire, never extinct in the minds of those who 
saw and were loyal enough to deplore and fear its results, to 
nullify the laws and eradicate the principles that favored and 
upheld the Spoils System. As a result a law was enacted requir¬ 
ing the heads of the seven departments at Washington to 
arrange the clerks of their respective departments iuto four 
classes: The annual salary of clerks of the fourth class to be 
$1,800; of the third, $1,600; of the second, $1,400; and of-the 
first, $1,200. It was further provided that no clerk should be 
appointed, in either of such classes, until examined “ and found 
qualified by a board of three examiners, to consist of the chief of 
the bureau or office into which such clerk is to be appointed, 
and two other clerks to be selected by the head of the depart¬ 
ment.” The next year Congress, under the power given by the 
Constitution, vested in heads of department authority, subject of 
course to such examination, to employ clerks of the four classes. 
Authority to appoint subordinates had, however, been exercised 


9 


by them a long while before, probably under some statute I have 
been unable to find, and incidental thereto was the power to 
remove their appointees. 

I next come to the much discussed tenure of office act of 1867, 
to the effect that any civil officer who was, or thereafter might be 
appointed, with the advice and consent of the Senate, should not 
be removed during his term, without the consent of the Senate, 
or another person, with the advice and consent of the Senate, had 
been appointed in his place. Not an amendment has been made 
to the Constitution, or a statute passed limiting the power of 
removal, except this act, passed during the conflict between the 
Senate and President Johnson. Grave doubts as to its constitu¬ 
tionality have always been expressed. It is claimed, on the one 
hand, that the power of removal is wholly with the appointing 
power; whom the President appoints, he alone may remove; and 
on the other, that when appointments are made with the 
consent of the Senate, removals may, if Congress so provide, be 
made only with like consent. The effect of the act was to give 
to Senators a far wider and stronger hold on such offices, taking 
them from the control of the power responsible for their adminis¬ 
tration and placing them more irresistibly with the spoils already 
accumulated. 

Such is the legislation tending to foster or hinder the growth 
of the Spoils System during what I may term the second period 
of the history of the civil service. It began with the ill-omened 
act of 1820, which gave that system its first foothold in the 
Federal Government. The system proved hardy and vigorous, 
and at the close of the period, in 1870, prevailed throughout 
the National Government and many of the State and municipal 
governments. Of its effects, let two statesmen who were wit¬ 
nesses of its growth, speak. Of it Mr. Webster said: “This 
principle of claiming a monopoly of office by right of conquest, 
unless the public shall effectually rebuke and restrain it, will 
entirely change the character of our Government. It elevates 
party above country; it forgets the common weal in the pursuit 

of personal emolument; it tends to form, it does form, w r e see 
2 


IO 


that it lias formed, a political combination united by no common 
principle or opinions among its members, either upon the powers 
of the Government or the true policy of the country, but held 
together simply ns an association, under the charm of a popular 
head, seeking to maintain possession of the Government by a vig¬ 
orous exercise of its patronage.” And Mr. Calhoun said : “ W hen 
it came to be understood that all who hold office, hold by the tenure 
of partisan zeal and party service, it is easy to sec that the cer¬ 
tain, direct and inevitable tendency of such a state of things is to 
convert the entire body of those in office into corrupt and supple 
instruments of power, and to raise up a host of hungry, greedy 
and subservient partisans, ready for every service, however base and 
corrupt. * * * To prepare for the subversion of liberty and 

the establishment of despotism, no scheme more perfect could be 
devised.” 

Cogent proof of the evil results of the existence of the Spoils 
System lies in the fact that many intelligent citizens regard it as 
an essential element in our political system, and any attempt to 
return to the principles of our forefathers as impracticable. 

It may here be asked why the law of 1853 was ineffectual. I 
answer, for several reasons. 

First—Each of the Board of Examiners was liable to removal 
for party and political purposes. A refusal to pass an applicant 
might cause his removal, upon the request of the Senator or Con¬ 
gressman who proposed and supported the applicant. A refusal 
was therefore unlikely. 

Second—There was no competition and no standard. The 
applicant was examined privately, or in the presence of the 
official pressing his appointment. The examination was suited to 
the applicant. In the words of Mr. Mill: “It was a leaping liar 
t£st, and if the clerk did not come up to the bar it was some¬ 
what lowered,” or, if it was desirable to reject* the applicant it 
might be raised. 

Third—The examination was not open to all applicants. The 
board might examine Democrats, and refuse to examine Itepubli- 


cans, and vice versa. The applicants outside of official favorites 
might have no opportunity to pass the examination. 

As a fact, however, such examinations were perfunctory and 
formal. They were so spoken of by President Arthur when 
Collector at New York, while Mr. Graves testified, that when lie 
entered the civil service, twenty years ago, the only examination 
made in his case was, the superior in the department looked over 
his shoulder while writing, and said: “I think you will pass.” 

In 1871, in response to a public sentiment no longer to be 
withstood, an act was passed “authorizing the President to pre¬ 
scribe such regulations for the admission of persons into the civil 
service.... as may best promote the efficiency thereof, and ascertain 
the fitness of each candidate... .and ability for the branch of ser¬ 
vice into which he seeks to enter,” and for that purpose to employ 
suitable persons to conduct examinations of applicants. As the act 
of 1820 gave that system, which subverted and wrecked the prin¬ 
ciples originally controlling the civil service, its first foothold, this 
act was the first step towards restoring them. Tt has been fol¬ 
lowed by the act known as the “Pendleton Bill.” Leaving the 
technical language of this act, I will, as concisely as I am able, 
state the method it provides for reforming the civil service. 

The clerks and persons in each customs district and post- 
office, in which they together amount to as many as fifty, are to be 
arranged in four classes, but no mere laborer or workman is to be 
so classified. 

To those classes, and the classes of clerks of the departments 
at Washington, formed, as I have stated, under the act of 1853, 
this act applies. The President will appoint, as Civil Service 
Commissioners, three persons, holding no other official position 
under the United States, of whom not more than two will be of 
the same party. They will prepare for the President rules which 
must provide that all persons who seek to obtain employment in 
any of the classes to which the act relates, shall submit to open, com¬ 
petitive examinations, which shall be practical in their character 
and relate as far as may be to those matters which will fairly test 
their relative capacity and fitness to discharge the duties of the 


service into which they seek to be appointed. The Commissioners 
will make rules and regulations for such examinations; will select 
places for holding them at Washington, and, in each State and 
Territory, so located as to make it reasonably convenient and iuex- 
pensive for the applicants to attend. Those examinations will 
be held as frequently as the wants of the service demand, 
and will be conducted by and under the charge of Boards of 
Examiners, which will consist of at least three persons, residents 
of the State or Territory in which they are to act, and employed 
in the official service of the United States, to be selected by tin; 
Commissioners after consulting the head of the department or 
office in which such persons serve. 

A chief examiner, to be selected and employed by the Commis¬ 
sioners, will act with the examining boards, and secure accuracy, 
uniformity and justice in their proceedings, which shall at all 
times be open to him. The boards of examiners will report their 
proceedings and the examinations to the Commissioners, who will 
furnish to the appropriate appointing power the names of the appli¬ 
cants who pass the examinations for the respective classes, with 
the standing of each, as shown by the examinations, and those of 
the highest standing will be chosen to till vacancies in the class 
for which they were examined, and when chosen will serve for a 
period of probation, after which, if they have given satisfaction, 
they will be appointed, if not rejected. The various appointing 
powers will report to the Commissioners the names of those who 
are appointed and rejected, and those who arc transferred or 
removed, an 1 those who resign. After six months from the pass¬ 
age of the act no person can enter or be promoted into any of such 
classes until he has passed an examination, or is shown to be 
specially exempted therefrom in conformity with the act. 

Appointments to the departments at Washington will be 
apportioned among the States, Territories and the District of Co¬ 
lumbia, according to the last preceding census. The President 
may, with the consent of the Senate, remove a Commissioner, and 
the Commissioners may at any time remove and substitute another 
qualified person for any member of the Boards of Examiners. The 


l 3 


act makes provision for all needful records, reports, salaries, the 
use of public buildings, prohibits under a penalty any unfair or 
corrupt practices towards the applicants, and under a severe pen¬ 
alty, and in the most comprehensive and stringent language, pro¬ 
hibits political assessments in every conceivable form, and the use 
of official authority to coerce the political action of any person or 
body. The act will be supplemented by rules to be supplied by 
the Commissioners, covering minor details. 

In the protracted debate in the Senate, it was universally con¬ 
ceded and asserted that the civil service, in its present condition, 
was more or less inefficient, unduly expensive, and, as a political 
factor, highly demoralizing. 

The reasons for the act, the propositions upon which it 

rests, are that the offices of the Government are trusts for 

the people, existing solely to carry on and do the work and 

administer the affairs of the country, and the system which will 

ascertain, with most simplicity and certainty, the fitness of those 

who seek to fill the offices, and secure the appointment of those 

most fit, will have that work done and will administer those 

affairs most efficiently and inexpensively, with the most safety 

and benefits, and is the best system, and the one to be adopted. 

* 

That the existing system does not do that, inasmuch as it assumes 
that the offices are a supply of rewards or funds belonging to 
the party that has control of the Government, to be used, not 
only to compensate that party for its struggle in obtaining that 
control, but more especially the workers, the manipulators, the 
professional politicians in the party. The test is not, “ Is he com¬ 
petent to fill the position?” but is, “What has he done, and 
what can and will he do to secure and maintain the supremacy 
of the party?” Officeholders are regarded as a disciplined 
body to be led into service, or to be taxed for service by either 
political party, and thereby the real will of the whole people may 
be frustrated, and many grave political evils come. That 
the civil service has attained such magnitude, the clerks in 
each of some of the departments numbering thousands, and of 
others hundreds, that it is impossible for the head of a depart- 


14 


mcnt or a large office to know or determine the fitness of the 
applicants, even if political influence and custom left him free to 
select. The next best system for selecting must be adopted. 
Experience in England during the fifteen years last past, and in 
this country, under the law of 1871, has demonstrated that the 
system of competitive examinations is the most perfect yet 
devised, and that it furnishes reliable evidence of the ability and 
qualifications of the person examined to perform the duties of the 
office to which he seeks to be appointed, and shields the civil 
service and the country from the many evils of the Spoils System. 

The “ Pendleton Bill ” secures to a very limited range of offices 
the enforcement of this system. It carries the civil service of 
to-dav a little way - and a little way only—toward that of our 
forefathers As barriers between the two there are the statute of 
1820, and those like unto it, the “ Tenure of Office Act ” of 1867, 
the traditions and customs of half a century, and the powerful 
hostile influence of those who have grown up with and reached 
position and office under the Spoils System. 

I think most of you will understand the meaning and thought 
in my mind when speaking reproachfully of “politics” and 
“ politicians.” Those terms ought to be in honorable estimation; 
that they arc not, is due to their modern uses. I have no sym¬ 
pathy with those who, through disappointment, envy, ora lack of 
manhood, confine their political action to speaking of “ the dirty 
pool of politics,” and of politics as an unclean thing. Politics is, 
and I expect will always remain, more or less unclean. It is 
difficult to state to what extent corruption and universal suf¬ 
frage are necessarily concomitant. In England corruption through 
the use of money has increased step by step, and largely beyond 
proportion, with the extension of the franchise. Yet I think 
every citizen worthy of a country will exercise the privileges, 
which are the duties of citizenship, and it is his right and duty 
to insist and accomplish it, so far as he can, that his opinion, and 
the vote that gives it expression, shall not be nullified by a vote 
which is the expression of no opinion whatever, and reaches the 
ballot-box only as a means to obtain or retain “ Spoils,” or 
through fear of a superior officer or a mere gang of office seekers. 


THE REAL OBJECTS OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM. 


ESSAY READ BY CHARLES R. PRATT BEFORE THE ELMIRA ASSOCI¬ 
ATION, MONDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 12, 1883. 


Gentlemen of the Association —Although all advocates of 
civil service reform agree as to its importance and even necessity, 
and arc substantially at one as to the best means of accomplishing 
such reform, still I find not a little difference of opinion as to the 
real objects to be attained by such reform, and as to what par¬ 
ticular results to be obtained by the contemplated changes make 
such changes especially desirable. To a large class the improve¬ 
ment of the service itself is the only object. They complain that 
our present service is inefficient, unduly expensive, and corrupt, 
and seek, by some different methods of appointment to office, to 
remedy these evils. Others seem to be advocates, not of civil ser¬ 
vice reform, but of the theory of competitive examination, and 
urge a reform in the civil service merely as an opportunity to put 
their theory into practice. Competitive examinations they con¬ 
sider as the only true test of qualification and fitness, and as the only 
method by which certain classes of men, whom they consider 
especially adapted to fill public positions, have any chance of get¬ 
ting them. 

Now it is undoubtedly a fact that our present civil service is 
not what it ought to be. (What in the world is?) Moreover, it is 
possible and highly probable that it is not what it could be made; 
that in efficiency, economy, and integrity, it does not com¬ 
pare favorably with the service of other countries on the same 


16 

plane of civilization with ourselves. Again, it is highly probable 
that the service might, in those respects, be greatly improved by 
substituting, for our present methods of tilling official positions, 
a carefully devised system of competitive examinations. But 
our civil service is not in such a terrible plight. The formal, red 
tape methods of conducting the public business, with their num¬ 
erous checks and counter-checks; the constant surveillance of 
officials over the acts of each other; the pride of each head of a 
department to have the business of that department conducted in 
the best possible manner; the anxiety of each administration and 
the party in power to avoid scandal and occasion for criticism; all 
these influences, and many more that might be mentioned, tend to, 
and do, keep our present service in a condition, as to efficiency 
and honesty, at least respectable; while it is quite a question as to 
how a system of selection by competitive examinations will im¬ 
prove it. 

In fact, if this were all there was in civil service reform; if the 
proposed reform simply meant an improvement in the manner of 
conducting the public business, or if it simply meant, by the sub¬ 
stitution of a different method of selecting public officers, to 
exclude from official position those considered unfit, and to offer 
an opportunity to enter for those deemed specially adapted, the 
subject would not, at the present time, merit the attention that is 
now being given to it. If such were the only objects sought, 
there are other questions of far more vital importance to the 
couutry, and which would demand more immediate attention. 

Of an advocate of this movement who holds the opinions I 
have above expressed, the question may very pertinently be 
asked: "What are the objects of civil service reform ? What 
greatly desired results will be attained by such a reform as you 
advocate ? These questions I shall attempt briefly to answer. 
The civil business of the Government is carried on by about 100,- 
000 officers and employes, with salaries ranging from a few hun¬ 
dreds to many thousands of dollars. These officers receive their 
positions, nominally and theoretically, by appointment from the 
executive head of the Government. But really, the appointments 






17 

are made on the recommendation, if not at the dictation, of the 
representatives or party leaders of the different districts in 
"which, or from which, the appointments are made. In connection 
with tliis arrangement there has grown up also a custom of so 
long standing and so uniformly followed that it has gained among 
politicians almost the force of a law. This custom dictates that 
these official positions shall be distributed among those who have 
rendered the greatest amount of service to the party, and have 
done most to bring the party into power. They are bestowed 
avowedly as rewards for such services, and are looked upon and 
counted upon as such by the recipients. 

Now from this source spring woes unnumbered. In the first 
place it makes every election a war of conquest for the spoils of 
office. As in the middle ages the feudal lords and barons, with¬ 
out shadow of cause or provocation, made constant war upon 
each other for the sole purpose of conquest, and as, after each 
battle, the victor confiscated the estate of the vanquished and 
divided it among his retainers, so now our two political parties, 
with no other issue involved, make perodical war upon each 
other for the spoils of office, and to the victor belong the spoils, 
which are distributed accordingly. Again, to continue the 
historical parallel, as during those conflicts of the feudal barons, 
involving no questions of right or patriotism, there grew up a 
class of professional soldiers; men who made a business of fight¬ 
ing and were ready to espouse any cause or serve under any flag, 
so long as the pay was good or loot abundant—so in these times 
nas growm up a class of professional politicians; men who, ton 
greater or less extent, make a business of politics, and who, 
indifferent to principles or issues, render yeoman’s service to that 
party to which they happen to be attached, in the hope of reward 
from the spoils of office. 

Again; from this condition of our public service has sprung 
still another great evil. On account of our present methods of 
appointment to civil positions, giving to the political leaders the 
power to distribute the Government patronage among their 
followers, there has grown up that peculiar American iustitu- 
3 


18 


tion, the political boss. To push the historical parallel still 
further—as the old feudal lords, using and relying ui>on their 
hired men-at-arms, kept in subjection the people of the terri¬ 
tories over which they assumed control, relegating to them the 
duty of paying taxes and furnishing the revenues which were 
used in maintaining their hosts of mercenaries or of meeting the 
expenses of newYonquests—so our modern political louls, relying 
upon their armies of office seekers, keep the people practically in 
political subjection, giving them no voice in determining the 
policy of the party, and granting to them only the privilege of 
paying the taxes and furnishing the salaries which are to be 
distributed among their followers. 

These are, indeed, serious evils; but they arc not all, nor the 
worst that spring from our present methods of official appoint¬ 
ments. There is still another evil springing from the same source 
which, in its far reaching consequences and evil results, I consider 
more important and worthy of attention than any of the others. 
This evil consists in the extreme difficulty, under our present 
methods, of getting any question of principle or policy before the 
people for their determination, and the almost utter impossibility 
of obtaining a fair expression of the opinion of the people on 
such questions, when submitted to the pi. As I have before 
remarked, every election, as at present conducted, is merely a 
contest for the spoils of office; and, by election, I mean the whole 
process of getting a candidate into nomination and electing him, 
from the caucus to the polls. In these contests the people at large 
have but little practical interest. They are carried on almost 
entirely by the professional politicians, the people acting merely 
as spectators and abettors. It is a game played by the politicians 
with the offices for stakes, and they play to win. 

To men engaged in such a contest, and for such purposes, ques¬ 
tions of principle or policy are disturbing elements in the conflict. 
They are sure to bring uncertainty, and possibly disaster. Conse¬ 
quently all such questions arc carefully avoided, and neither party 
dare advocate any principle or line of policy on which a fair issue 
can be taken. Hence, not since the war has a fair issue on any 


*9 

national question been submitted to the people of this country, 
and no principle been advocated by either party, except such as 
were simply appeals to sectional or class prejudices. 

But even when such questions have been submitted to the 
people, as they have sometimes been in this State, they have met 
with no attention or consideration. People at large will not con¬ 
sider questions of this character unless urged upon their atten¬ 
tion. What is everybody’s business is nobody’s business. To 
the great mass of people politics is but a small part of life, and 
in order to receive any attention from them, questions of public 
interest must be brought to their attention and their importance 
urged upon them. But the very class of men, whose business it 
should be to present these questions to the people and urge upon 
them the importance of a correct determination of them, is the 
very class that now is especially interested in keeping such ques¬ 
tions out of sight and banishing them entirely from the realm of 
politics. And as the many, but slightly interested in any matter, 
are always influenced by the few who are deeply interested in tho 
same matter, so the professional politician determines the character 
of our entire political life, and the whole matter is looked upon 
by citizens at large as merely a strife for office and an affair with 
which questions of principle have nothing to do. True, tho 
newspapers make a show of discussing the supposed issues of a 
campaign, and speakers on the stump make some attempt to 
elucidate the principles of their party; but everywhere else, in 
private conversation, in the street, at the caucus and the polls, 
there is an absence of that old time discussion of principles and 
issues, but always the question as to who is ahead or what dodge 
is to be played next. 

It may be urged that this evil is due to a fault inherent in 
human nature; that people, generally, will not interest themselves 
in questions of public welfare which do not directly and 
apparently affect their personal interests; that in small, primitive 
communities, where every man’s welfare is directly affected by the 
public weal, it is possible to obtain a due consider vtiou and iftr 
determination of public questions; but that in larger com- 



20 


inanities, with more complicated and exacting methods of 
business and modes of living, and where the relation of public 
to private welfare is less apparent, the mass of people, 
engrossed in personal affairs, can not be brought to the due con¬ 
sideration of public questions. My only reply to this is that it 
may be so; but that our Government was founded on another 
theory. The Republic was established in the confident expecta¬ 
tion that a people as far advanced as we in civilization will, as a 
general rule, duly consider and rightly determine all questions 
affecting the public welfare. If this expectation be not well 
founded the government of the people, by the people, and for the 
people, if not an Utopian dream impossible of realization, has at 
least been prematurely attempted, and will have to be deferred 
to some more evolved state of the race. 

The first question that suggests itself in considering these evils 
that spring from our present political methods is, of course, the 
question of remedy. It seems to me that in what I have already said 
I have substantially indicated what the first step in any attempt to 
eradicate these evils should be. It is the elimination from 
politics of the professional politician. It is, if possible, to do 
away with that class of persons who, making politics a busi¬ 
ness, follow it merely for the spoils of office. This at first sight 
would seem to be an almost herculean task. There is, however 
one way in which it can be accomplished, and only one. It can 
only be effected by making the business unprofitable. If it were 
made impossible for party leaders and political bosses to reward 
their followers, they would lose their following. If no amount of 
political activity or service to a party would avail in the procuring 
of official position, those who now are so active in rendering such 
services for such purposes would soon seek fresh fields and pas¬ 
tures new. In other words, if the whole power of making official 
appointments was taken away from the executive head of the 
Government, substituting therefor some more or less automatic 
method of filling such positions, and leaving in the hands of no 
persons, or set of persons, the power of bestowing patronage, the 
professional politician's occupation would be gone and the great 


2 I 


army of office-seekers would be dispersed. This is substantially 
what the advocates of civil service reform propose to accomplish, 
so far as it can be under the Constitution. 

But there still remains a very important question. If the power 
of tilling these subordinate positions in the Executive department 
of the Government is taken away from the head of that depart¬ 
ment, where it would seem properly to belong, in what manner 
shall those positions be tilled? And this question brings us directly 
to the consideration of the merits of competitive examinations. 
I am not an ardent advocate of this method. I am somewhat 
skeptical, and I find that those who have had most experience with 
examinations in general are still more skeptical as to its efficacy 
as a test of qualification and fitness. Still more do I repudiate 
some of the arguments advanced by advocates of this system. 
By some its adoption is urged on the ground that it will afford 
opportunities to obtain official positions to a large class of men 
whom they consider well adapted to till such positions, but who, on 
account of their distaste and lack of adaptation to practical poli¬ 
tics, have no chance of obtaining them under our present methods. 
Others advocate the system on the theory that it will give to 
every American youth, whatever his color, race, or previous con¬ 
dition, a fair chance o/ obtaining official position. 

There seems to be inherent in the constitution of the average 
American a ruling passion for office; and there seems also to be 
widely disseminated a feeling, if not belief, that one of the main 
purposes of a government is to afford opportunities for the satis¬ 
faction of this ambition. Now, it can not be too strongly borne 
in mind that the civil service of a government exists for the pur¬ 
pose of carrying on the civil business of that government, and 
it is a matter of comparative indifference what men or class 
of men occupy the positions in such service, so long as the busi¬ 
ness of the government is conducted in the best possible manner. 

Much has been said during the discussion of this question of 
civil service reform, about conducting the business of the Govern¬ 
ment on business principles. Now, business principles, if they 
have any application in this connection, would dictate that the 


22 


responsible head of any department should have the sole power 
of appointing his subordinates, not only on account of that very 
responsibility, but for the further reason that he is supposed to be 
best acquainted with the duties to be performed and the qualifi¬ 
cations necessary to perform them. And unquestionably this 
would be the proper and by far the best method of filling such 
positions, could the heads of departments be relied upon to fill 
them with an eye single to the efficiency of the service. But a 
government department and an ordinary business diller in this, 
that whereas the head of a business holds his position inde¬ 
pendent of those he employs, the head of a government department, 
under our present methods, owes his position directly or indirectly 
to the services of the very men who are demanding office under 
him and whose services were rendered with the express or tacit 
understanding that they were to be so rewarded. Moreover, the 
very maintenance of his position by such head of department, and 
the continuance of his party in power, depends to a great exteut 
on the judicious and politic use of the patronage under his con¬ 
trol. Bo it happens that the best and most natural method of 
filling subordinate positions in the world generally, is the very 
method which, on account of its attendant evils, must be 
abandoned in filling official positions. 

And so again we come to competitive examinations. It may be 
that some better method may yet be devised. It may be that 
something better has already been suggested and escaped my 
attention; but so far as l know, notwithstanding its many imper¬ 
fections, competitive examination is the next best method of 
selecting our public servants. Most of the prejudice, and many 
of the objections to competitive examinations arise from a narrow 
view of examinations in general, founded upon our experience of 
them in the past. There are many things about a man that deter¬ 
mine his qualifications and fitness for any work. To mention a 
few of them: There are, first, his natural ablitics, and the charac¬ 
ter or direction of those abilities. Secondly, his acquired abili¬ 
ties, or the amount of cultivation and improvement his faculties 
have received from exercise and training, and the direction of that 


2 3 

improvement. Thirdly, there are his acquirements, or the knowl¬ 
edge lie has attained by study, or contact with the world, and 
the character or direction of those acquirements. Now, I think 
it will not be questioned that examinations, as they have been 
conducted in the past, and as they are generally understood, 
have been directed to determining oftly the acquirements of the 
person examined, and not only that, but to determining his 
acquirements in one direction only; namely, his knowledge of the 
contents of books. So that the very word examination brings 
back to most of us unpleasant recollections oT school or college, 
and is associated in our minds almost exclusively with scholarly 
attainments. 

But need examinations be confined to this narrow field? Is it 
not possible for a body of men, fully understanding and making 
a special study of the subject, to devise such a system of examina¬ 
tions as shall determine the entire capabilities of a man, and 
thoroughly test his fitness for any position for which he is a can¬ 
didate? 

But, whether this can be accomplished or not, any method 
■which shall give us a civil service as good even as the one we 
have at present, and which, at the same time, takes the filling of 
subordinate official positions entirely out of the realm of politics, 
will greatly assist in the attainment of the objects sought by the 
advocates of civil cervice reform. 



















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